Contractual Democracy by Gersbach, Hans
Contractual Democracy
HANS GERSBACH∗
CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland and CEPR
Recent contributions suggest that introducing political contracts could make liberal democracy more
efficient without altering its fundamental values. Such contracts might foster the public ’s trust in
politics. In this article, we review and structure the current state of affairs on Contractual
Democracy. We discuss four archetypes of political contracts and ways of implementing them. We
outline the certification and control procedures for political contracts, and address the major concerns
arising with regard to Contractual Democracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of liberal democracy is to promote the well-being of society
while preserving its own fundamental values.1 Yet, although they are socially
desirable, many political projects fail to materialize in democracy. The
reasons for such political failures are documented in well-known literature
sources.2 Recent contributions contain a set of ideas that aim at improving
the functioning of liberal democracy without interfering with its fundamental
rules and values. The proposals for improving democratic elections center
around political contracts, which can supplement democratic elections and
help to select, motivate and control politicians.
Political contracts, offered by candidates for public office (or designed by
the legislature), differ from contracts in the private sector3 in various
important respects. First, political contracts are not agreements between two
parties, but one-sided written declarations of electoral promises of politicians,
coupled with remunerations or sanctions, depending on whether these
promises are kept or not. Second, political contracts are subject to the rules
of liberal democracy: only promises that do not interfere with the
fundamental rules of liberal democracy can become political contracts. In
particular , periodic, free, and anonymous elections with equal voting rights
to select the office holders for the executive and legislative branches should
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not be endangered by political contracts. Similarly, equal rights in competing
for public office, the separation of powers – with an independent judicial
system –, and respect for basic rights are cornerstones of liberal democracy
that must be respected by the issuers of political contracts. As a consequence,
political contracts are subordinate to the fundamental rules of liberal
democracy in a hierarchy where the latter must not be altered by the former.
We call this hierarchical model “Contractual Democracy.”
The first purpose of this article is to review and to structure the current
state of affairs on Contractual Democracy.4 We advocate a specific
certification and renegotiation procedure, and we propose several avenues
for further research. Finally, we address the major concerns connected with
the proposal.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce four
archetypes of political contracts and discuss some areas where they could be
applied. In section 3, we outline how political contracts can be introduced
and how liberal democracy can actually be transformed into Contractual
Democracy. In the fourth section we outline the certification procedure for
political contracts and discuss renegotiation clauses. In section 5 we discuss
the potential of political contracts. In section 6 we illustrate how threshold
contracts work by an example. In section 7 we address general concerns
arising in connection with Contractual Democracy. Section 8 concludes.
2. FOUR ARCHETYPES OF POLITICAL CONTRACTS
In this section we describe four archetypes of political contracts that can be
used to improve the functioning of democracy. We use the expression
“political actors” for parties or single candidates competing for office and
thus potentially offering political contracts.
2.1. REELECTION THRESHOLD CONTRACTS
2.1.1. The Contract
The first type of political contract is the reelection threshold contract. A
threshold contract stipulates a performance level that a politician must reach
by the end of a term to obtain the right to stand for reelection. The
performance level or threshold must be either a number (or a set of
numbers), or it must describe a non-manipulable and decidable event.
The extent to which election promises – in the form of thresholds – have
been honored is assessed before the next election. If a politician has failed to
meet “his” threshold, he loses his right to run for reelection. If he has been
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successful, the politician can run for office in the customary way, and
democratic elections take place.5
2.1.2. Examples
There are various well-known situations where threshold contracts could
have been applied. After US President George Bush senior had announced
“read my lips: no new taxes”, threshold contracts would not have allowed
him to stand for reelection after having gone back on this campaign
promise.6 Another example comes from Germany. In their election
campaigns in the 90s, both candidates for the office of Chancellor, Kohl and
Schröder, pledged to reduce unemployment. Both promises would have
qualified for a threshold contract as outlined above, and both politicians
failed to keep their promise. If the promise had been secured by a threshold
contract, they would have left office much sooner or might have succeeded
in reducing unemployment. Finally, politicians frequently promise to reduce
government debt during campaigns. Public debt levels would qualify for a
performance level defined in a threshold contract.7
2.1.3. Sophisticated Threshold Contracts
Simple threshold contracts can be adjusted in three directions. First,
threshold contracts of political actors can be conditional on the coalition
formed to govern the country after the election. Such conditional contracts
prevent political actors from making promises that will become untenable if
they are forced into a coalition after elections. A famous example where such
conditional threshold contracts might have been helpful was observed in
2005 in Germany, where the large parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, made
promises regarding the value-added tax rate that were incompatible with one
another. When both parties were forced into a coalition, the parties reneged
on their promises.8
Second, thresholds can be based on prices on an information market.9 The
information market can be used to predict the next-but-one reelection
chances of an incumbent, for instance, which serves as an indicator for the
long-term well-being of a society.
Third, threshold contracts may be based on the actual election outcome
and are called “vote-share contracts.”10 Such a contract stipulates a vote
threshold above 12 , which the incumbent has to reach in order to be
reelected. Hence it becomes harder for an incumbent to be reelected than for
a politician who is competing for office for the first time. More generally,
vote-share contracts can be made dependent on the number of terms an
office holder has served.11C
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Such contracts require a careful implementation. If the incumbent does not
reach the threshold, the challenger may be declared elected. However, as the
vote share of the challenger may be below 12 , a separate run-off ballot
between two candidates appears to be preferable in such cases. One
candidate could be the challenger from the first election and the other
candidate could be new. The possible run-off between two challengers could
occur simultaneously with the election between the incumbent and his
challenger, as one can combine both ballots. The second vote in the run-off
will only be relevant if the incumbent does not reach the vote threshold.
2.2. OTHER SHORT-TERM (MONETARY OR NON-MONETARY)
CONTRACTS
2.2.1. The Contract
Short-term monetary contracts stipulate how the salaries of politicians will
vary with the performance they achieve within a term. Various performance
criteria are conceivable: the size of the budget deficit, whether or not specific
important public projects have been undertaken, or whether specific laws
have been abolished or introduced.12
Short-term contracts can also involve immaterial benefits (or
punishments). For instance, bad performance could imply general elections
earlier than at the end of a normal term, while excellent performance could
imply a prolonged term in office before the next election is called.
2.2.2. Examples
Short-term monetary contracts have been used in some provinces in Canada.
In the province of Manitoba, for instance, the salary of each member of the
Executive Council was made dependent on the fiscal discipline in a particular
period and on whether the budget balance was violated repeatedly (see
Kennedy and Robbins, 2001). In Germany, the leader of the Liberal Party of
Baden-Württemberg, one of the Federal States, suggested that the members
of the cabinet should conclude a contract on the aims of the government.
This contract would prescribe a loss of 10 to 30 percent of their salary if
those aims were not met (see, e.g., Homburger, 2005).
In Yukon, Canada, an interesting non-monetary contract was devised in
the Taxpayer Protection Act, R.S.Y. 2002. If an accumulated deficit has
occurred, or an existing deficit increased, the Legislative Assembly is to be
dissolved, as it did not fulfill its budget-control duty. Moreover, a specific
procedure for eliminating an accumulated deficit is outlined (see Kennedy and
Robbins, 2001).
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In England, the Comprehensive Performance Assessment framework
introduced in 2001 rated local governments on the quality of major services
they provide. The scheme includes incentive components for elected
officials, such as targeted support for councils in difficult environments and
rewards for better-performing councils. For an analysis of this scheme,
whether and how it provides incentives and how it interacts with voting
behavior, see Boyne (2009), Revelli (2010), and Lockwood and Porcelli (2012).
2.2.3. Coalition-Membership Contracts by Parties
A special short-term contract is a coalition-membership contract that
specifies the set of possible partners a party is willing (or unwilling) to accept
when forming a government coalition. If a party violates its
coalition-membership contract, i.e., if it enters into a coalition with a partner
that was excluded from the list of possible parties in the contract prior to the
election, it would be punished accordingly, a possible penalty being the
reduction of public party-funding. Coalition-membership contracts could
have been applied in Germany, for instance, at the general election in 2005.
The SPD stated before the election that it would not form a coalition
involving the party “Die Linke.” This promise was kept. However, at the
state election of 2008 in Hesse, the SPD made the same promise, but
subsequently proved willing to renege on it.13
2.3. LONG-TERM (MONETARY OR NON-MONETARY) CONTRACTS
2.3.1. The Contract
Long-term contracts make the utility of politicians after the current term
dependent on the outcomes they can influence by their actions today. The
reward can either be granted in the next period of office or after retirement
from office. Monetary rewards such as variations in salaries and pensions can
be used for this purpose.14
Immaterial rewards are equally conceivable. For example, a politician
honoring election promises could have his next period in office extended by
one year if he is reelected. Politicians retiring from office after performing
well in long-term projects might be granted a seat in a governmental advisory
board of elder statesmen, or might obtain the status of “Father of the State.”
2.3.2. Examples
Long-term political contracts could be used in various areas, such as
unemployment or budget balance. If unemployment or the national debt
have been reduced within a number of years, or if a politician has succeeded
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in keeping a balanced budget over a long time-span, he might be granted a
reward. A particular form of long-term contract conditions future rewards
upon specific events, such as the implementation of large projects or
international treaties. Similar or longer time-horizons are imaginable in the
area of climate change. A politician may obtain the status of a “Father of the
State,” for instance, if he significantly reduces the emissions of greenhouse
gases over a decade.
2.4. CONTRACTS FOR FUTUREMAJORITIES
A fourth type of political contract can motivate politicians to undertake
projects for those voters who are in the minority today, but will be in the
majority tomorrow. A basic idea for such contracts is rejection/support
rewards (RSRs).
2.4.1. The Contract
RSRs work as follows: If an incumbent is rejected in his bid for reelection,
but receives the majority of votes from the younger generation, say,
individuals below the age of 45, he is entitled to a special reward, i.e. a
pecuniary or non-pecuniary utility transfer. The practical application of RSRs
requires that ballots be differentiated according to the age of citizens. Given
a particular threshold for age (say 45), ballots must contain an indicator
variable that assigns a voter to one of the two age classes.
2.4.2. Examples
RSRs could be applied as a general rule in democracies.15 RSRs are
particularly relevant for political projects where the initiation of policy
measures and their consequences are decades apart, e.g. the mitigation of
climate change or investment in basic research. Hence, it would also be
conceivable to couple RSRs directly with the question whether an incumbent
undertakes long-term projects at all. Then, RSRs would only apply if the
incumbent offered a long-term political contract including specific projects
of this nature.
3. INTRODUCING AND PROPOSING POLITICAL
CONTRACTS
There are two fundamental questions regarding the introduction of political
contracts.
 Will the legislature allow such contracts?
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 Will such contracts be offered at all?
3.1. ALLOWANCE OF CONTRACTS
The answer to the first question could be affirmative if such contracts
actually improve the well-being of the current generation. However, as
politicians themselves may not benefit from such contracts (see, e.g., Gersbach
and Liessem, 2008a), a governing parliament majority may decide to neither
offer nor accept laws allowing political contracts. Nevertheless, the
competition among parties to form governments can foster the introduction
of laws that allow political contracts. This was suggested, for instance, in
Gersbach (2004).16
Introducing political contracts is particularly difficult for rejection/support
rewards, as such rules are designed to benefit younger generations that have
no majority at present.
Two changes are necessary. First, at the operational level, RSRs must be
coupled with a change in the voting procedure, as ballot papers must bear an
indicator of the age class to which each voter belongs. Second, RSRs must be
introduced at the constitutional level, coupled with a qualified majority
requirement for their abolishment. Otherwise, the older generation would
eliminate RSRs even if they had been introduced before. In Gersbach and
Kleinschmidt (2009), two ways of implementing RSRs, delayed introduction and
funding by the younger generation, are identified.
First, delayed introduction means that the proposal to introduce RSRs
would comprise their being implemented only after a delay. Second, the
younger generation could set up an organization that collects funds to pay
RSRs. Once an office holder is deselected, he would be awarded an RSR if he
has received a majority of votes from the younger generation.
3.2. INTRODUCING SPECIFIC CONTRACTS
As to the question whether contracts will be offered at all, one has to
distinguish two cases.
3.2.1. Case I : Competition of Political Actors for Contracts
The easiest way is to allow candidates for public office to compete by
offering political contracts. Here, it will be entirely up to the politicians to
decide which type of political contracts – if any – they intend to propose.17
As politicians have only limited power and may depend on the approval of
other bodies to undertake policy projects, they will be careful when designing
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their political contracts and may wish to obtain the agreement of their party
to create collective responsibility for fulfilling the contract. Several papers
have shown that once political contracts are allowed, competition between
politicians ensures their actual introduction (Gersbach, 2004; Müller, 2007; and
Gersbach and Liessem, 2008a).
3.2.2. Case II : Design by Legislature
It is also possible for the parliament itself to impose political contracts on the
members of the executive branch (e.g., Gersbach, 2003). This is particularly
important for members of the executive branch not elected by the public, but
appointed by government bodies. Short-term contracts for ministers, for
instance, have to be designed by the parliament. Moreover, it might be useful
if the parliament – and not the political actors themselves – designed
monetary incentive contracts of any kind to prevent voters from suspecting
“self-service behavior” on the part of the politicians.
4. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE AND
RENEGOTIATION
4.1. THE CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT
As summarized in the introduction, there are some important differences
between principal/agent relationships in the private sector and the
relationship between the electorate and the politicians. In particular, political
contracts are one-sided written declarations of the electoral promises of a
politician, and are subordinated to the rules of liberal democracy. The latter
difference simply constrains the set of feasible political contracts. The former
difference raises the question whether political contracts are in the interest of
the electorate. This will be addressed in section 5. Moreover, as the public is
not involved – nor signs political contracts –, additional procedures are
needed to define how the electorate can accept a political contract and how
such contracts will be enforced. This will be dealt with next.
4.2. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
As in economic models of contracts between private agents (see, e.g., Watson,
2007), the contracting environment in the political sphere has to be dealt with
carefully. We propose the following procedure to certify political contracts in
the case of reelection threshold contracts, other short-term contracts, and
long-term contracts.
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An official body, which we shall call the “certification authority,” reviews
the following conditions:
 Does the proposed contract respect the values of liberal democracy?
 Does the proposal for a political contract tie feasible policy projects
to their outcomes?
 Are the terms of the contract and its time frame described in such a
way that a clear-cut answer is possible as to whether the contract
has been fulfilled or not when the contract is up for review? In
other words, is the contract verifiable?
If – and only if – the answers to all three questions are affirmative, the
certification authority will approve the proposals. A necessary condition is
the availability of hard and non-manipulable information at the time of
review. A certified proposal is published and functions as a political contract.
Later, the certification authority can also serve as an external enforcer.
4.3. ORGANIZATION
The certification procedure outlined above requires a certification and
enforcement authority. Such an authority has to be independent from
political parties forming the government, as otherwise, the political parties in
power may be able to alter the legislation on political contracts, which would
undermine enforcement.
Therefore, the certification and enforcement authority cannot be part of
the legislative or executive branch. There are several options. First, it could
be a separate entity of the constitutional court. Second, in countries in which
non-partisan representatives of the state exist which are independent of the
executive and legislative branch, the certification of political contracts could
be one of their tasks. In Germany, for example, the Federal President could
act as the certification authority. In both cases, constitutional court or
Federal President, no specific appointment procedures are required, as
existing bodies are entrusted with the tasks of certification and enforcement.
Still, political economic reasoning suggests that private interests and the
political preferences of such bodies may matter, as they also have to be
appointed by the legislature or by a separate body.
4.4. RENEGOTIATION
With the exception of rejection/support rewards, political contracts should
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be coupled with a clause that allows the cancellation of the contract in the
event of extraordinary circumstances such as a war or catastrophes. The
cancellation of certified political contracts should be possible if it is approved
by a super-majority of members of the parliament. One could also imagine
other forms of renegotiation.18 In particular, one could allow a contract
holder to offer an alternative political contract for the remaining duration of
the original contract. If the new contract is certified and supported by a
super-majority of members of the parliament, it will replace the old one.
5. POTENTIAL OF POLITICAL CONTRACTS
In this section we discuss the types of political failure that can be alleviated
by the different political contracts.19
5.1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
With the exception of RSRs, discussed in subsection 5.5, all political
contracts have some common features. The main advantage of political
contracts is the increased incentive to honor election promises. Politicians
seeking office make promises in an attempt to influence the voters’ beliefs
about the policies that a politician will undertake, if elected, and about the
politician’s abilities. To some extent, repeated elections can punish candidates
who renege on their campaign promises.20
However, politicians may lack the incentive to honor promises and to
devote a socially desirable amount of effort to certain tasks. Numerous
reasons why this might happen have been put forward in the literature,
including a weak relationship between past performance and reelection
chances, political uncertainty in general,21 the finite time-horizon of the
politician, the rational ignorance of voters,22 a long time-span between policy
measures and outcomes, lags in the observability of outcomes,23 or the
lobbying of special interest groups. Even without these reasons, the
electorate’s threat to coordinate on deselecting incumbents who have failed
to deliver on their promises may be time-inconsistent (Aragones et al., 2007).
When the ability of a challenger is perceived to be below that of the
incumbent, for instance, deselection is not in the interest of the electorate at
the election date, even if the office holder has reneged on his promises.
The kind of commitment achieved by political contracts would encourage
– if not enforce – serious efforts to convert election promises into policies.
Such positive incentive effects have been shown, e.g., in Gersbach (2005) and
Gersbach and Liessem (2008a). These positive incentive effects survive when
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preferences of the candidates are unknown to the public (Liessem, 2008).
Moreover, political contracts would facilitate and improve communication
between politicians and the public. They would enhance the politicians’
authenticity, as those unwilling to commit to certified promises would lose
some of their credibility. The separation into more or less credible promises
would not only improve exchanges between citizens and politicians, it would
also strengthen the citizens’ trust in politics, an objective that is desirable in
its own right.
Still, political contracts do not eliminate the heterogeneity of citizens’
preferences for particular policies, and each polity has to decide on how
much to redistribute. Moreover, political contracts might also have
disadvantages. Politicians might focus too exclusively on the realization of
their certified promises to the detriment of other areas. This and other
concerns will be taken up in subsection 7.3.
5.2. THRESHOLD CONTRACTS
The considerations outlined above apply for all contracts except RSRs, but
they are particularly noticeable for threshold contracts.
Threshold contracts may also curb the influence of well-organized special
interest groups, as office holders are better protected against lobbying
activities. Moreover, threshold contracts in the form of limits on tax rates, for
instance, decrease the perks of politicians (see Gersbach and Schneider, 2008).
Vote-threshold contracts create further and other types of incentive
effects. When the reelection hurdle for a politician increases with the number
of terms in office, this not only motivates the office holder to work hard to
increase the welfare of the citizens, it also curbs welfare-reducing
incumbency advantages whose existence has been documented in the
political-economic literature. Hence entry will become easier. Moreover, as
reelection becomes harder and harder, an incumbent may renounce
reelection campaigns earlier than under normal elections. Hence vote-share
thresholds will shorten the tenure of politicians.
Threshold contracts may also be useful in providing incentives for
competent individuals to run for election.24 Competent candidates can offer
tighter thresholds and thus increase their election chances over other
candidates. Yet, as less competent candidates have an incentive to pool with
competent candidates in order to get elected at least once, voters face a
serious inference problem if competence cannot be observed. Still, in
comparison to elections alone, the possibility of using threshold contracts
should help voters in their selection efforts.25 This selection argument is,
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however, as yet less developed than the incentive argument.
However, political competition with threshold contracts may also
encourage overpromising. In order to get elected at least once, candidates
may offer threshold contracts that promise many good things to society but
will never be fulfilled. This problem is examined in Gersbach and Müller
(2006), where it is shown that voters can use simple election schemes to
punish overpromising behavior.
One downside risk of threshold contracts is posed by near-end-of-term
negative incentive effects. If a politician has no chance of meeting his
threshold near the end of his term, he might behave like a “lame duck,”
reducing his efforts because his reelection chances are nil.
5.3. OTHER SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS
In principle, similar considerations can be applied to other short-term
contracts. There are, however, important differences between short-term
monetary contracts and threshold contracts. Short-term monetary contracts
are less vulnerable to overpromising, as bad performance is punished
immediately by a salary reduction. For non-elected ministers, such contracts
can also be easier to use. However, the drawback of short-term monetary
contracts is the type of reward/punishment they entail. As elected politicians
tend to care more about power, the policies they can implement, and their
own career opportunities after holding office than about money, it is easier to
select, control and motivate office holders by threshold contracts than by
monetary rewards. Threshold contracts affect the most important elements in
the utility of a politician directly.
5.4. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
In modern national economies, the time-span between the initiation of policy
measures and their outcome is often very long, frequently exceeding one
election period. Tax reforms, budget balance, reforms of the labor market,
reduction of CO2 emissions, and basic research investment to promote the
development of new technologies are well-known examples. To be reelected,
politicians have to offer visible proof of their accomplishments before the
next elections. Accordingly, they may lack the incentive to undertake policies
that will only produce benefits after their period of office is over. As the
reelection mechanism does not foster the implementation of long-term
projects, long-term political contracts can be used to promote them.
Gersbach (2003) introduces long-term contracts and shows how the public
can make the value of a second term in office dependent on the realization of
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the outcomes of long-term policy projects. As a consequence, the incentive
for a politician operating under such political contracts to undertake socially
desirable long-term policies increases.
Gersbach (2004) shows that competition for office among politicians with
long-term political contracts that will become effective upon reelection
alleviates inefficient decision-making in politics. The contract still helps to
increase public welfare if the public is unsure about the politicians’ time
preferences. The incentive for the electorate to reject the incumbent in order
to economize on his future remunerations can be neutralized by parachute
clauses. Such clauses guarantee a future bonus to a politician, even if he is no
longer in office. The positive incentive effects remain operative for various
alternative formulations of the utilities of politicians, as shown by Müller
(2007).
Long-term political contracts may, however, also be used to tie the hands
of future governments. For instance, current office holders may write
contracts including large infrastructure projects which take a long time to
build and which put the corresponding financing burden on future
generations. As we know from the literature, such possibilities may lead to
inefficient outcomes (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a discussion).
Inefficiencies of this kind may reduce the efficiency gains of the long-term
contracts identified above.
5.5. REJECTION/SUPPORT REWARDS
Democracy may find it particularly difficult to pursue policies that mainly
benefit future generations. If the beneficiaries of such long-term policies only
form a minority today, politicians may not undertake them, since this would
reduce their chances of being reelected. The problem of socially desirable
policy projects whose investment expenditure only pays off much later was
discussed extensively in connection with government debt, social security,
and global warming.
When a society experiences a slow-down or even a decline in population
growth, for instance, adjustment and/or change of the pay-as-you-go system
becomes inevitable to alleviate the burden on the younger generation, and to
sustain incentives for growth. Such changes, however, may leave a majority
of voters – retirees and individuals close to retirement age – worse off, as
their expected net benefits would decline. Hence, pension reforms may not
be politically feasible, although – from a welfare perspective taking future
generations into account – they are, in fact, desirable.26
Global warming is a similar inter-generational investment problem,
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coupled with more uncertainty about returns, this time. Most predictions
suggest that the temperature associated with thermal equilibrium on earth
will increase because of rapidly rising stocks of greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2007).
Such temperature changes may have a sizable impact on the well-being of
future generations,27 while a substantial part of the costs of emission
reduction is borne by the older generations.
Thus, RSRs should induce politicians to act on behalf of the younger
generation, even against the interests of the majority of the current electorate.
Yet if RSRs can induce socially desirable long-term policies, they may
nonetheless also invite excessive investment at the expense of the current
generation when politicians try to obtain them. Gersbach and Kleinschmidt
(2009) show that optimally-designed RSRs will balance the benefits and costs
of this instrument, so that it is welfare-improving.
RSRs can introduce severe time-inconsistencies: young voters may favor
RSRs today, but may prefer their abolishment when they are old and have to
bear costs from policies that are favorable to younger generations. As
discussed in subsection 3.1, additional rules are required to overcome such
time-inconsistency problems.
5.6. SUMMARY
Political contracts tend to have positive incentive and selection effects, and
may reduce socially-undesirable spending. Moreover, we may justifiably
expect such contracts to improve communication between the public and the
politicians, and to foster the trust in politicians and democratic institutions, a
consequence that is beneficial in its own right. Of course, our imagination
may not cover every metamorphosis democratic decision-making will
undergo when political contracts are introduced, and the research on
Contractual Democracy is still in its infancy.
6.AN ILLUSTRATIONOFTHRESHOLDCONTRACTS
In this section we use an example to illustrate how threshold contracts work.
This example and all proofs of the propositions are based on Gersbach and
Liessem (2008a).
6.1. THEMODEL
We consider a simple effort problem with risk-neutral voters and politicians.
We consider a typical period in which the incumbent has to exert effort e on
a task T. The effort e on task T creates benefits b for the public in this
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period,28 given by
b  e .     (1)
The reelection chances of politicians are influenced by their past
performance, but the link may be weak.29 We assume that reelection chances
can be summarized by a continuous probability function pb, i.e. pb is the
probability that the politician will be reelected if benefit b is realized. In our
example, pb is given by
pb 
0 for b ≤ b ,
  b for b ≤ b ≤ b ,
1 for b ≥ b ,
with −1 ≤  ≤ 0 ,   0 and b  −  . Furthermore, pb̄  1 requires that
b̄  1 −  / .
The expected utility of the politician is given by
W 1  pbW 2 − C e .     (2)
W1 denotes the utility of office in the current period, W2 the discounted
utility of office in the next period, and C e the cost of exerting effort. The
utility from holding office may include monetary benefits, such as a fixed
remuneration, and non-monetary benefits, such as prestige or the desire to
have power. As utility W1 from office in the current period is sunk after the
politician has been elected, it can be neglected. The remaining expected utility
takes the form
U Ab,e  pbW 2 − C e  peW 2 − C e : U Ae .     (3)
The participation constraint PC  amounts to
pbW 2 − C e ≥ 0 ,     (4)
noting that the utility of the outside option has been normalized to zero. If
the politician intends to stand for reelection, he chooses an effort level that
maximizes his expected utility given by
e  arg max
e
 pbW 2 − Ce.     (5)
The agent’s cost C e is assumed to be given as follows:
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Proposition 1: Under the reelection scheme pb , the politician chooses his
effort according to
e∗ 
0 for W2c  −4 2 ,
 W22c for −4 2 ≤
W2
c ≤ 2 1− 2 ,
b̄ for W2c  2 1− 2 .
In a variety of circumstances, the reelection mechanism creates inefficiencies
compared to the second-best outcome, as the politician may be able to secure
his reelection with an effort smaller than eSB, may choose low effort levels
that involve the risk of deselection, or he may choose e  0. The second-best
outcome would be implemented if b̄  eSB and 21− /2 W2 /c.
6.4. CAMPAIGNING WITH THRESHOLD CONTRACTS
Next we allow politicians to offer a threshold contract themselves during a
campaign. Such a contract contains a threshold value b̂ with the following
interpretation: If the benefit realized at the end of the current period is
smaller than b̂, the politician cannot stand for reelection. Otherwise, the
politician can stand for reelection, and free and anonymous elections will take
place.
We assume that there is a campaign stage before the current period, in
which two political candidates, denoted by i, j, offer threshold contracts with
values b̂i , b̂j to the public, which will become effective upon election. The
cost parameter of exerting effort of politicians i, j is identical and equal to c.
The structure of the game is summarized as follows:
Stage 1 → Two politicians i and j offer threshold contracts with values b̂i , b̂j .
Stage 2 → Voters observe the threshold offers and elect one of the candidates.
Stage 3 → The elected politician exerts his effort on task T.
Stage 4 → The benefit from the politician’s activity is realized. The public
observes the benefit signal b. If b  b̂i , b̂j respectively, the politician is
disallowed from seeking another term. If b ≥ b̂i , b̂j respectively, the politician is
allowed to stand for reelection.
We impose the tie-breaking rule that the politician works in the interest of
the public if he is indifferent between two options. We first look at the
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consequences when a politician, say i , has offered threshold b̂i and is
elected. The politician’s reelection probability changes to
p e, b̂i 
0 for b ≤ max b, b̂i  ,
  b for b̂i ≤ b̄ and max b, b̂i  ≤ b ≤ b̄ ,
1 for b ≥ max  b̄, b̂i  .
The politician chooses his efforts according to the modified incentive
constraint, which amounts to
e  arg max pe, b̂iW2 − ce2.
This yields
Proposition 2: Three types of solutions can occur :
( i ) e  0 (lower corner solution) ,
( ii ) e  max b̄, b̂i (upper corner solution) ,
( iii ) eintb̂i  max W22c , b̂i (interior solution ) .
The proposition indicates that the threshold contract increases the upper
corner solution and the interior solutions if an adequate threshold signal is
stipulated. In the upper corner solution, the effort level increases if a
threshold signal b̂i  b̄ is chosen. For the interior solutions, the effort level
increases if a threshold signal b̂i with b̂i  W2 /2c is chosen.
We use ei∗b̂i and ej∗b̂j to denote the global optimum of the politician’s
maximization problem. It follows that ei∗eSBej∗eSBeSB. Moreover, the
PC  is fulfilled at b̂i  b̂j eSB, since we have assumed b̄ ≤ eSB.
We now look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. We assume
that each politician is elected with a probability of 1/2, if the expected
benefits for the public are the same for both candidates, i.e. ei∗b̂i  ej∗b̂j.
Then we obtain
Proposition 3: There exists a unique equilibrium in which both politicians
offer the threshold values b̂i∗  b̂j∗  eSB.
Hence, competition for elections with threshold contracts produces the
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second-best outcome. The reasoning is as follows: Threshold value offers
b̂i∗  b̂j∗  eSB are an equilibrium, because a downward deviation by a
politician would yield zero election probability for him. A deviation to a
higher threshold would also eliminate his chances to be elected, as an office
holder i with b̂i  eSB would choose e  0 when in office. Using standard
Bertrand reasoning, it is straightforward to see that any other strategy
combination cannot be an equilibrium.
6.5. OPTIMAL REELECTION SCHEMES
It is important to stress that the potential of threshold contracts to improve
outcomes relies on the reelection scheme with weak links considered in this
example. In this example with a one-shot election, it would be possible for
the electorate to choose a reelection scheme that mimics the reelection
threshold contract and only reelects incumbents if the benefits are at least as
high as eSB.
However, typically, such reelection schemes are not best responses when
the link between effort and benefits is garbled by random events and in
repeated election games, as the electorate cannot expect that a new candidate
will perform better than the incumbent.31
7. CONCERNS
In this section we address some general concerns regarding Contractual
Democracy.
7.1. EXTERNAL OR UNPREDICTABLE EVENTS
A possible argument against political contracts is that external and/or
unpredictable events might prevent politicians from achieving the goals they
have committed themselves to.
When the outcomes of policy measures are influenced by random events,
the link between the politicians’ efforts and their reelection chances becomes
weaker. Such random events, however, do not destroy the positive incentive
effects as long as the politicians have some influence on the likelihood of
their reelection (see, e.g., Gersbach and Liessem, 2008a).
There are external events whose occurrence makes the fulfillment of the
political contract itself socially undesirable. In the event of a threat to
national security, for instance, it can be in the interest of the electorate to
postpone balancing the budget. As discussed in section 4, a pre-specified
renegotiation procedure can resolve such cases.
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If the linking of a politician’s effort to an outcome on a particular task is
characterized by substantial uncertainty, political contracts may fail to
provide additional incentives and may not justify certification – and such
enforcement procedures are likely to be costly. We would expect politicians
to remain cautious when offering political contracts on issues whose
outcome is highly uncertain, and legislatures may renounce imposing them
on the executive branch. However, this does not preclude from offering
political contracts on other tasks.
7.2. THE CERTIFICATION PROBLEM
Only a subset of political tasks will qualify for certification, and thus allow
political contracts.32 Political tasks whose outcomes can be measured by
macroeconomic, social or environmental indicators could qualify for
certification. Examples are GDP, unemployment, fiscal discipline, tax rates,
crime indices, or CO2 emissons. In all of these cases, however, it is crucial to
elaborate a precise definition of the indicators and to designate a neutral third
party who will collect and verify the corresponding data. Other examples of
usable “contract matter” are projects allowing a simple yes/no answer as to
their implementation (building a bridge, abolishing a law, raising retirement
age, etc.). In other areas, such as the reform of health care or the judicial
system, the certification problem is much more severe, as no single indicator
is available.33
The heterogeneity of certification possibilities across political tasks gives
rise to multi-task concerns, which we will address in the next subsection.
Overall, there are already enough examples where political contracts could be
applied. Moreover, we expect the number of certifiable political tasks to
increase considerably when Contractual Democracy is introduced.
7.3. THEMULTI-TASK PROBLEM
Politicians in the executive and legislative branch are typically concerned with
many different issues. As discussed in the last subsection, some issues can, in
principle, be quantified with sufficient precision, while this is not the case for
other issues. In a significant part of their activities, politicians’ performance
cannot be measured with a sufficient degree of precision. The theory of
multi-task incentive problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) has shown that
severe measurement constraints on some tasks can make it unwise or
impossible to use high-powered incentive schemes. Such considerations
challenge our proposal, as the effort allocation of politicians might be even
more distorted in a Contractual Democracy, where political contracts center
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around some specific tasks, than in normal democracy. As discussed in
section 5, politicians might focus too exclusively on the realization of their
certified promises, while neglecting other areas, especially under threshold
contracts. If politicians are only judged by their employment performance,
for instance, they may simply inflate the public sector to meet the required
standard, and neglect other important issues.
A variety of considerations lessens this concern. First, certified election
promises are a threshold to candidacy. Hence the potential advantage for
those candidates who pass the threshold would not be greater than it already
is in a normal democracy. Second, in the theory of multi-task problems,
Gersbach (1998) has also shown that global control – which corresponds to
elections in the political sphere – can only provide optimal incentives in
particular circumstances, and is usually dominated by task-specific control.
Third, the multi-task and measurement problem can even be alleviated by
the hierarchical scheme defining Contractual Democracy. This has been
shown in the context of long-term contracts by Gersbach and Liessem
(2008b). The contract works as follows: A politician can only stand for
reelection if he is willing to base his future income or his right to stand for
reelection on his performance in a single issue, say unemployment. If he
accepts this incentive component, he can stand for reelection, and voters can
judge his performance on the remaining issues. If he has accepted the
incentive contract, but has only worked to reduce unemployment, voters may
not reelect him because he has a bad record on other important issues.
Gersbach and Liessem (2008b) show that while multi-task problems
introduce effort distortions with or without political contracts, such
distortions decline when political contracts on one task are introduced.
7.4. THE DEMOCRACY PROBLEM
One might argue that Contractual Democracy is no longer a liberal
democracy. By construction, this concern should not apply, as political
contracts will not be certified if they alter the essence of a liberal democracy.
Still, one might argue that the politician’s self-imposed constraints on
reelections might violate the universal right to candidacy at any time.
However, as limits to the number of terms are also accepted in many
democracies, self-imposed, conditional term limits introduced by threshold
contracts could be adopted as well. Shortening the term by calling general
elections in the case of poor performance does not violate any fundamental
principle of liberal democracy either. A more delicate case might be political
contracts that allow a lengthening of the term by some pre-specified
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time-span in the case of good performance, as discussed in subsection 2.2, as
this could undermine the legitimacy of politics. Thus, those possibilities have
to be limited.
Politicians might commit to campaign promises by signing private
contracts. For instance, a politician could sign a contract with a charity,
promising it a particular amount of money if he reneges on a promise
specified in the contract. The politician might also deposit up-front a specific
amount of money in a fund (bonding). This amount would only be returned
to him if he kept his promise. In that case, he might even receive an extra
bonus taken from private contributions. While such arrangements are
conceivable in principle, they are not allowed in a Contractual Democracy, as
they would allow interest groups to buy themselves directly into political
processes. Moreover, it is likely that accountability to private persons or
companies would undermine both accountability to the public and the
public’s trust in political processes and politicians. On the contrary, political
contracts are intended to strengthen the accountability of politicians towards
the public and to foster the public’s trust in politics.
7.5. OTHER CONCERNS
There are various further concerns that have to be addressed. We provide six
examples: First, one might argue that political contracts inhibit the formation
of coalition governments, as the contracts of candidates and parties may be
incompatible. As discussed in subsection 2.1, political contracts that are
conditional on the formation of coalitions avoid such inconsistencies.
Second, allowing all types of political contracts might generate conflicting
incentives for politicians. For instance, when short-term and long-term
political contracts are used simultaneously on intertwined issues, the
politicians’ actions might not simultaneously foster the fulfillment of both
types of contract. The inconsistency problem can be largely avoided if
contract design is primarily left to political actors such as candidates and
parties, and the legislatures only act subsidiarily, and for non-elected public
officials, in particular.
Third, a democracy does not operate in isolation, and is embedded in a
market economy in most cases. How a societal system with a Contractual
Democracy impacts on the market economy is an open issue. There are no
obvious reasons to think that the impact will be negative. Fourth, one might
be concerned about an increased incentive for opposition parties to filibuster
policy projects in order to keep an incumbent from honoring his contract, if
the rules allow such activities. Candidates will take such possibilities into
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account when offering political contracts. Moreover, as endless blockades are
risky and may make opposition parties more accountable, the level of
wasteful filibustering might actually sink in Contractual Democracy.
Fifth, one might argue that there are alternative democratic institutions that
may achieve the same objectives. For instance, milder forms of the
mechanisms proposed in this paper may suffice. Instead of reelection
threshold contracts, one could rely on the information generated by the
certification process alone, for instance. Voters would receive the
information whether the certified promises have been kept, but the
incumbent would not be formally denied to stand for reelection if he did not
deliver. Ultimately, however, such milder forms tend to reintroduce the
reliance on the voters’ strong interest in punishing incumbents who renege
on their promises, which political contracts can avoid.
Sixth, political contracts have not been used in most democracies so far.
There are several possible explanations for this. First, political contracts are
institutional innovations that have not been advocated with ideas and
procedures that are easy to implement up to now. Second, politicians that are
in power may be worse off after the introduction of political contracts.
Challengers may not benefit immediately, as they can only propose the
introduction of political contracts, but cannot offer political contracts
themselves, as the legal framework has to be introduced beforehand. Hence,
the absence of political contracts does not speak against them.
8. CONCLUSION
Modern liberal democracy can afford to use political contracts. However,
such an implementation will require changes in constitutional and legislative
norms. It will be necessary to establish the simplest and most promising way
of using political contracts while keeping the administrative repercussions as
slight as possible.
Contractual Democracy would radically alter the course of political action.
Our suggestions indicate that the potential of liberal democracy has not been
exhausted yet and that improvements through Contractual Democracy are
not utopian, but a worthwhile goal.
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1. In general, this well-being is expressed by a social welfare function. In some, but not all
cases, promoting the well-being of the median voter or applying the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion is a useful practical guideline for policy-making.
2. See Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Olson (1965, 1982), Niskanen (1971), Tollison (1982),
Mueller (1989), Bernholz and Breyer (1993/94), Dixit (1996), Drazen (2000), Persson and
Tabellini (2000), Saint-Paul (2000) and Gersbach (2005).
3. The corresponding contract theory in the private area is surveyed, e.g., by Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005), and Schweizer (1999).
4. The initial phase of Contractual Democracy has been developed in Gersbach (2005).
5. For an analysis of such contracts, see Gersbach and Liessem (2008a) for a single task, and
Gersbach and Liessem (2008b) for multiple tasks.
6. For an analysis of tax contracts in three- and four-party systems, see Gersbach and
Schneider (2008, 2009).
7. For an analysis of such debt-threshold contracts, see Gersbach (2010). We note that office
holders may have incentives to increase implicit debt burden in order to lower explicit
public debt as much as possible if reaching the threshold becomes difficult. This can
weaken the pressure for fiscal stability.
8. The grand coalition formed by the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social
Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
increased the value-added tax by three percentage points, which exceeded the declared
intentions of both parties during the election campaign. The CDU/CSU had announced a
two-percentage-point increase, and the SPD had pledged not to increase the tax rate at all.
For a comparison between conditional and unconditional tax contracts, see Gersbach and
Schneider (2008).
9. For an analysis of such contracts, see Gersbach and Müller (2006).
10. See Gersbach (2007b). This theme has been further developed by Gersbach (2009) and
Gersbach and Müller (2012).
11. From a welfare perspective, we conjecture that the vote threshold is increasing with the
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number of terms.
12. Making remuneration of politicians dependent on specific policies was first examined in
Gersbach (2003). In Gersbach (2004), politicians are allowed to compete with such
schemes.
13. Due to internal party opposition, the envisaged coalition could not be formed. “Was die
Wähler an der Politik so richtig nervt,” http://www.welt.de/politik/article1781706
(retrieved August 7, 2012).
14. For the first analysis of such contracts, see Gersbach (2003). In Gersbach (2004), the
competition of politicians for such contracts is examined.
15. For an analysis, see Gersbach and Kleinschmidt (2009).
16. The case is more complicated when there are separate elections for the legislative and
executive branches, as in the US or in France.
17. In election models, it is, typically, either assumed that politicians commit to policies or
cannot commit. In a Contractual Democracy, politicians can formulate certifiable
campaign promises and can choose for which of these promises they are willing to risk
utility losses.
18. The possibility for parties to renegotiate in the midst of a contractual relationship is
central to contract theory (see Hart and Moore (1988), and Maskin and Moore (1999) for
general characterization results).
19. Some ideas have been advocated to a broader audience in two short policy contributions
(Gersbach, 2007a, and Gersbach, 2007c).
20. See the classic papers by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Austen-Smith and Banks (1989),
and more recent models by Banks and Duggan (2002) and Aragones et al. (2007).
21. A nice example of how political uncertainty might impede economic growth by reducing
public investment in the formation of human capital is given by Hashimzade and Davis
(2006).
22. Voters may even have systematically biased beliefs about economic forces (Caplan, 2002)
that may induce an office holder to disregard his promise.
23. Of course, these causes are neither mutually exclusive nor fully independent sources of
political failure.
24. Moreover, to achieve socially desirable outcomes, the preferences of selected politicians
should be sufficiently congruent to those of the electorate.
25. Whether or not competence or statesmanship can be signaled in elections alone has been
explored in Gersbach (1999).
26. Starting with Browning (1975), a strand of literature (see Myles (1995) for a survey) has
shown that voting equilibria regarding social security benefits and contribution rates lead
to a social security budget that is excessive from a welfare point of view. The political
economy of social security has been developed substantially further by Tabellini (2000),
Casamatta et al. (2000), and Wagener (2002). Börsch-Supan (2000) provides an in-depth
study for the German case.
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27. See, e.g., Boehringer and Vogt (2003), Goulder and Pizer (2008), McKibbinand Wilcoxen
(2002), Nordhaus (2006), Nordhaus and Boyer (1999), Schelling (2002), Stern (2006), and
Tol (2006).
28. Additional benefits may also materialize in the next period, but this has no bearing on our
main results.
29. For a microfoundation of weak links, see Gersbach and Liessem (2008a), Alesina and
Rosenthal (1995), and Fearon (1999).
30. In a first-best solution, aggregate welfare (consisting of the utilities of voters and of the
politician) is maximized. In such a first-best solution, the participation constraint of the
politician can still be honored, but it may require additional transfers from voters.
31. Details are available upon request.
32. Even if an event becomes commonly known, it may not be verifiable by the external
enforcer.
33. In some areas, however, a quality index similar to an inflation index can be targeted.
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